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Abstract: In recent years, Europe has witnessed an accelerated process of economic integration. Trade 
barriers were removed, the euro was introduced and ten new member states have joined the European 
Union. This paper analyzes how this process of increased economic integration has affected  labor and 
product markets. To this end, we use a panel of Belgian manufacturing firms to estimate price-cost 
margins and union bargaining power and show how various measures of globalization affect them.  
Our findings can be summarized as follows: On average, firms set prices about 30% above marginal 
costs, but there is substantial variation across sectors, with the lowest mark-up around 19% and the 
highest around 52%. In addition, we find evidence that unions bargain over both wages and 
employment. We estimate an index of bargaining power, which reflects the fraction of profits that is 
passed on to workers into higher wages. Depending on the sector, this fraction varies between 6% and 
18% and it increases with the markups of firms. Finally, we find that globalization puts pressure on 
both markups and union bargaining power, especially when there is increased competition from the low 
wage countries. This suggests that increased globalization is associated with a moderation of wage 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, Europe has witnessed an accelerated process of economic 
integration: Within the EU market barriers were removed, the  Euro was introduced in 
twelve member states and ten new member states joined the EU in 2004. On a global 
level, the EU is confronted with the rapid development of several Asian countries, the 
membership of China in the WTO and the emergence of China and India as new 
world powers.  
This trend towards market integration and globalization opens up European 
economies to international trade and foreign competition. This is seen in Table 1 
where selected indicators of trade openness and their evolution are reported for the 
EU. Trade has become more important over the last decade. Compared to 1992 total 
trade in the EU as a percentage of GDP has gone up substantially and especially so 
between the EU and the rest of the world. At the same time, the regional pattern of 
trade has been shifting. In 1992 only 4 % of total extra-EU imports came from China. 
By 2003 the Chinese market share had increased to 10%. Likewise, the share of the 
new member states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) in extra EU15-imports 
attained 16% in 2003. Such figures imply that trade flows from low wage regions 
have gained substantial ground in a relatively short period of time.  
In recent years, many papers have been written on the role globalization has 
had on wage and employment  outcomes. Most papers, however, find only limited 
effects of international trade on wages but larger effects on employment, especially 
for European labor markets. This is most likely due to the more rigid nature of wages 
and wage setting institutions in Europe1. This wage setting process typically depends 
on factors such as the monetary policy regime, the integration of product markets, the 
existence of collective agreements and the bargaining power of unions and employers. 
Globalization affects these factors. As Rodrik (1997) points out, globalization 
weakens the bargaining position of trade unions as it increases the substitutability of 
employees. Furthermore, globalization is likely to put downward pressure on price-
cost margins, which limits the scope of rent sharing with trade unions. Such 
interactions between product and labor markets are emphasized in various macro 
models that show how more competitive pricing in the product markets has beneficial 
                                                 
1 For a nice overview of these studies see Part II, European Economy (2005) 
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effects, such as lower unemployment rates, on labor market outcomes (e.g. Blanchard 
and Giavazzi, 2003).  
This paper adds to this literature in various ways. First, we simultaneously 
estimate price-cost margins and union bargaining power. Most papers study 
imperfections in product and labor markets separately2. However, ignoring labor 
market imperfections when measuring competitiveness in the product market, leads to 
product market power being underestimated. We follow a production function 
approach as in Hall (1988) and extended by Crépon et al (2002) to estimate price-cost 
margins and bargaining power. We apply Olley and Pakes (1996) to deal with the 
endogeneity of productivity shocks. Second, we analyze how price setting and 
bargaining power is affected by globalization, for which we use several measures 
including import penetration, outsourcing and foreign direct investment. Third, we 
use Belgium firm level data in our analysis. This has a number of advantages.  
Belgium is characterized by strong labor unions and rigid product markets. It 
therefore provides an interesting benchmark to test how international integration 
affects a small regulated economy in the core of the European Union. Moreover the 
firm level data available are unusually rich. Our data set includes all firms between 
1996 and 2004 that have to submit by Belgian law full or abbreviated company 
accounts. In light of the recent insights of Melitz (2003) and others on the role of firm 
heterogeneity in international trade it seems natural to use micro data to model the 
effects of international competition. Finally, Belgium is characterized by a substantial 
increase in its volume of trade. Figure 1 shows how the value of trade in Belgium has 
increased with almost 70% during the last decade, while the value of output rose only 
with 40%. As a consequence most manufacturing sectors experienced a rising import 
penetration between 1997 and 2004(see Figure 2). The increase in import penetration 
was especially pronounced in Chemicals, Electrical Machinery and Wearing Apparel.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop a stylized 
theoretical framework that captures the effects of international competition on price-
cost margins and labor market outcomes. Section 3 introduces the model that we seek 
to estimate and discusses the estimation strategy. Section 4 discusses the results and 
section 5 concludes the paper. 
                                                 
2 Exceptions are Bughin(1993, 1996),  Konings and Walsh (1994), Crépon et al. (2002),  Dobbelaere 
(2004) and Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2006).  
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2. The Effects of Globalization: Theoretical Background 
 
To focus ideas it is useful to introduce a standard benchmark model with one 
production factor labor (see Blanchard, 2005). The model illustrates how interactions 
between the product and the labor market matter for understanding equilibrium 
unemployment. It is built around two crucial equations, the first being a wage-setting 
relation, the second a price-setting relation.  
Turning to the wage equation first, let the nominal wage level depend on the 
actual price level (P)3 and on a function that captures the institutional factors that 
determine wages or 
 
),( zuPFW =       (1) 
 
Where W stands for the nominal wage, u for the unemployment rate, z for all 
other factors affecting the wage. Typically, the unemployment rate exerts a negative 
influence on the wage. The intuition is straightforward: a higher unemployment rate 
weakens the bargaining position of workers and so lowers the wage. 
A similar equation can be derived for the price-setting behavior of firms. To 
keep things simple,  we assume that prices are set as a simple mark-up over the wage 
or 
 
WP )1( μ+=       (2) 
 
In equation (2) the degree of competition in the product market plays a 
determining role. In a non-competitive product market, prices are set significantly 
higher than  marginal cost (W in this model) resulting in a large mark-up μ. In a 
perfectly competitive market, μ=0 and prices are fully determined by the wage (hence 
the real wage W/P reaches a maximum value equal to 1). 
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium point A in this simple economy, where the 
price-setting relation is equal to the wage-setting relation. Through its impact on the 
                                                 
3 Typically, it depends on the expected price level, but for simplicity we assume that the expected 
prices are equal to the actual prices. In the Belgian context of wage indexation this is a reasonable 
assumption. 
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mark-up μ, the degree of competition in the product market has an impact on the 
equilibrium unemployment rate. Hence, characteristics of the product market affect 
the equilibrium outcome in the labor market. 
How does economic integration in the product market affect the labor market 
in this simple framework? A variety of theoretical models show that economic 
integration causes μ to fall e.g. when integration makes more product varieties 
available (Krugman, 1979, cf. Chen et al. (2006) for a recent application) and/or 
reduces the market share of domestic firms (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). In Figure 
3 international competition therefore shift the price-setting equation upwards: for 
given wage levels, prices are lower and hence real wage costs for firms rise to a level 
closer to the competitive benchmark. As a consequence, profit rates for individual 
companies decline. In addition, international economic integration changes the wage-
setting relationship. For a given unemployment rate, lower profit rates translate in 
smaller rents that can be redistributed to union members. If globalization moreover 
implies that multinational enterprises can shift employment across affiliates more 
easily4, then the bargaining power of workers will decline. All of this will force union 
members to accept wage moderation, shifting the wage setting curve down. The new 
equilibrium is found in B. Compared to the initial equilibrium in A, equilibrium 
unemployment has gone down, prices and nominal wages are lower and the markup 
μ’ of prices over wage costs has been reduced.  
The bottom-line from this analysis is that interactions between product and 
labor markets matter for understanding equilibrium unemployment of an economy. It 
is also clear though that the effects of international competition depend very much on 
the slopes and the responsiveness of the wage and price-setting relations in the 
economy, which is ultimately an empirical question. This is what we take up in the 
rest of the paper. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Recent evidence confirms that multinational enterprises do relocate employment across affiliates, for 
the US see Brainard and Riker (1997) and Hanson, Matoloni and Slaughter (2004) for the US, for 
Europe see Braconier and Ekholm (2000) and Konings and Murphy (2006). 
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3. Empirical Model and Methodology 
 
The model relies on the work of Hall (1988) who showed that the Solow 
residual should be corrected for imperfect competition in the product market. It 
thereby offers a method to estimate the price cost margin without observing prices 
and marginal costs directly. Starting from a production function where output itQ  of 
firm i  in year t  is produced from three inputs, namely labor itL , capital itK and 
materials itM : 
 
),,( ititititit MKLFAQ =        (3) 
 
Where itA  captures the productivity level. The function (.)F  is homogeneous of 
degree λ+1  for all input factors, i.e. the returns to scale are λ+1 . (.)F  can exhibit 
decreasing ( 0<λ ), constant ( 0=λ ) or increasing ( 0>λ ) returns to scale. By taking 
a total differential of (3) we get:  
 
ititititititMitititLitit akkmklkq Δ+Δ+−Δ+−Δ=−Δ λεε )()()( ,,   (4) 
 
The variables itititit kmlq ,,,  and ita  are the natural logarithms of itititit KMLQ ,,,  and 
itA  respectively. Xε  is the elasticity of output with respect to input X , namely 
Q
X
X
Q
X δ
δε = . Now, we use the first order conditions of profit maximization, which 
imply that XX μαε = : 
 
( ) ititititititMitititLititit akkmklkq Δ+Δ+−Δ+−Δ=−Δ λααμ )()()( ,,   (5) 
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Where 
it
it
it MC
P=μ  or the mark-up at the output market and Xα  is the cost share in 
total revenue of input X , i.e. 
PQ
XPX  (X=L,M,K). We can also rewrite (5) in terms of 
the Lerner index, itβ  defined as 
itit
itit
it P
MCP
μβ
11−=−=  or (5) becomes5 
 
( )
itititit
itititMitititLitit
akkq
kmklkq
Δ−+Δ+−Δ
=−Δ+−Δ−−Δ
)1()(
)()()( ,,
βμ
λβ
αα
    (6) 
 
From this equation the Lerner index and returns to scale can be estimated. 
Note that by the use of first differences, any firm-specific fixed effect from the level 
equation is eliminated. This framework has been used to estimate the impact of trade 
liberalization on market power of firms in a number of papers, starting with 
Levinsohn (1993) for Turkey and Harrison (1994) for Côte-d’-Ivoir and more recently  
by Konings, Van Cayseele and Warzynski (2001, 2005) for a number of industrialized 
and emerging economies. 
As pointed out by Crépon et al (2002), one potential problem of this 
framework is that it assumes competitive labor markets. However, most European 
countries are characterized by labor markets where negotiations between unions and 
firms take place. We therefore follow Crépon et al (2002) to incorporate a model of 
efficient bargaining in the above framework. In this model unions and firms bargain 
over both wages and employment6. In particular, the typical Nash bargaining problem 
can be summarized as follows: 
 
Φ−Φ −−−+=Ω 1
,
)())((max wLPQwLwLLLw aaLw     (7) 
 
                                                 
5 Furthermore, we assume that the mark-up is common across firms in the same sector. 
6 For an application of this approach to the Belgian context see also Dobbelaere (2004) 
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Where L  is union membership, LL ≤<0 , and aw  represents the alternative 
wage7. Φ  is the union bargaining power; 10 ≤Φ≤ . Maximizing the equation for 
employment and wage rate gives the following first order conditions: 
 
L
PQww a Φ+Φ−= )1(      (8) 
L
L R
L
LRPQw +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −Φ=  with 
L
PQRL ∂
∂= )(    (9) 
 
Solving these two expressions simultaneously gives an expression for the contract 
curve, aL wR = . Using L
QP
L
Q
Q
PQRL ∂
∂=∂
∂
∂
∂= μ
)(  together with (8) and the expression 
for the contract curve, one can find that: 
 
)1(
1
−Φ−
Φ+= LLL αμμαε       (10) 
 
Combining equations (4) and (10), an extra term which captures the union bargaining 
power appears in equation (6) or 
 
( )
ititititLititit
itititMitititLitit
aklkkq
kmklkq
Δ−+−Δ−Φ−
Φ+Δ+−Δ=
−Δ+−Δ−−Δ
)1()()1(
1
))((
)()()(
,
,,
βαμ
λβ
αα
 (11) 
 
This will be our basic equation used in the further analysis and allows us to 
estimate price cost margins and bargaining power simultaneously without having to 
make assumptions about the alternative wage rate. Crépon et al. (2002) show that in 
this setting the price-cost mark-up must be interpreted as the ratio of price over cost 
evaluated at the alternative wage instead of the bargained wage8.  
                                                 
7 Note that for now we assume there is no other variable input factor than labor, so we assume the 
materials input to be fixed. This does not affect the bargaining outcome as long as the union 
preferences do not depend on materials (Bughin 1993, 1996). However, we also experimented with a 
different specification such that the profit of the firm that is bargained over equals )( wLzMPQ −−  
like in Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2006), with z the price of materials. The main results hold also for 
this specification. The union bargaining power was estimated to be higher however. 
8 This follows from the fact that in the efficient bargaining framework marginal revenue of labor equals 
the alternative wage. As a result, firms makes input and output decisions as if it was maximizing profit 
computed at the alternative wage. 
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A potential problem with estimating (11) is the endogeneity of the unobserved 
productivity shock, itaΔ . Since itl  is a variable input, it depends on the productivity 
ita  in the same period. As a result itlΔ  is correlated with itaΔ  and OLS estimates of 
the bargaining term are likely to be biased. Similarly, itqΔ  will be correlated with 
itaΔ  because higher productivity will lead to higher output.  
One solution is to use an instrumental variables approach. Unfortunately, it is 
often difficult to come up with appropriate instruments. Our alternative approach is 
based on recent findings of the productivity literature, more specifically on the 
methodology to estimate production functions developed by Olley and Pakes (1996). 
We follow Hoekman and Kee (2003) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2006), who 
have applied this methodology to estimate price-cost margins.  This approach proxies 
the unobservable productivity shock by a polynomial in capital and investment, both 
in present and lagged values. We describe this approach in more detail in the 
Appendix to this paper. This approach yields consistent estimates for the Lerner index 
and for union bargaining power but does not allow a separate identification of the 
returns to scale parameter. The reason is that the capital coefficient is no longer 
identified because the productivity shock is proxied by a polynomial in capital and 
investment. This is not a major problem since our main interest lies in identifying the 
price-cost margins and union bargaining power. 
 
 
4. Data and Results 
 
4.1. Data 
 
Firm data are taken from the Belfirst database. The database includes the full 
company accounts of every Belgian firm that has to report to the tax authorities. It 
includes the whole manufacturing sector (NACE code 15 to 36) with the exception of 
the recycling sector. We retrieved data for the period 1996 to 2004. The variables 
used for the analysis are turnover, tangible fixed assets, number of employees (in full 
time equivalents), wage bill and material costs (raw materials, consumables and 
services). Turnover is deflated with a Producer Price Index at the 3 digit NACE level 
provided by Eurostat. If this PPI was not available for the sector, a 2 digit NACE 
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deflator was used. Tangible assets are deflated using a countrywide investment 
deflator and material costs are deflated with a NACE 2 digit intermediate goods 
deflator, constructed from the input-output tables. The database provides also 
information about the ownership structure, so we are able to determine whether a firm 
has a foreign owner. However we only observe ownership in 2004. Imports and 
country of origin of the imports, are made available by the National Bank of Belgium 
also at the 4 digit NACE level. 
In order for a firm to be added to the sample, we required at least three 
consecutive observations in our sample. In addition, we dropped observations which 
seemed to be obvious data input mistakes (such as firms with negative wage costs), 
observations for which the growth rates in inputs and output were unrealistically high 
and firms which reported labour costs to be higher than gross value added. Our final 
sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 6125 firms and in total 35222 observations. 
In Table 2 we report summary statistics. The median firm has 17 employees, earns a 
revenue of 3.05 million euros and faces a labor cost of 34,100 euros per employee per 
year. The labor cost share in total turnover is about 22% in the average manufacturing 
firm. 
 
 
4.2 Estimation results for the mark-up and bargaining power  
 
We start by estimating equation (6) and (11) to first obtain an estimate of the 
average mark-up without and with controlling for the bargaining power of the union. 
In a second set of regressions we augment equation (11) with factors that capture 
international economic integration9.  
Table 3 reports the results for the mark-up and bargaining power in the 
combined sample of all manufacturing companies. In the first column we report a 
simple OLS estimate of equation (6). In the second column we provide OLS estimates 
of equation (11) where we control for the bargaining power of firms. Finally in the 
third column  we apply the Olley-Pakes correction to equation (11) in order to correct 
                                                 
9 All tables report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
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for potential endogeneity of the right hand side variables. All equations are estimated 
with year and industry dummies, capturing time and industry specific shocks10.  
From column (1), it can be seen that the average mark-up11 in Belgian industry 
is around 1.28. This increases in column (2) to 1.35 when we take into account that 
unions bargain over wages and employment with employers. The Olley-Pakes 
correction in the last column does not affect our results all that much12. The fact that 
the average mark-up is smaller when the bargaining power of firms is not taken into 
account is expected as the bargaining power term is likely to be positively correlated 
with the mark-up term. 
The estimates of the average mark-up are in line with earlier work by Konings, 
Van Cayseele and Warzynski (2001) who report for Belgium an average mark-up of 
1.28. These findings are also consistent with the results found by Dobbelaere (2004) 
and Crépon et al. (2002), who estimate an average mark-up and bargaining power for 
Belgium and France of 1.49 and 1.42 respectively.  
How important are sectoral differences in mark-ups and levels of bargaining 
power? To address this question, we estimated equation (11) for each 2-digit NACE 
sector separately13. The estimated sectoral mark-ups are reported in Figure 4. The 
mark-up ranges from 1.19 to 1.54. Sectors with a high mark-up are Medical, Precision 
and Optical Instruments, Basic Metals, Electrical Machinery and Publishing and 
Printing. Sectors with a low mark-up include Pulp and Paper Products, Furniture and 
Manufacturing n.e.c., Motor Vehicles and Wearing Apparel. We computed the 
accounting Lerner index as 
turnover
costs material-bill wage-turnover  and compared the 
results with the estimated Lerner index. The correlation coefficient between the two 
measures equals 0.72. 
Figure 5 shows the bargaining power per 2 digit NACE sector. In order to 
check whether these estimates are sensible we compared them with a wage over labor 
                                                 
10 The estimations were also done with interactions between time and industry dummies. This did not 
change the results. 
11 
βμ −= 1
1  
12 Note that for the correction only the observations with positive investment can be used. Estimation of 
specification (3) on this sub sample showed a Lerner index of 0.258 and the coefficient for the 
bargaining term was 0.137. 
13 Tobacco products (NACE 16), Leather (NACE 19), Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 
(NACE 23), Office machinery and computers (NACE 30), Audio, TV and Telecommunication 
apparatus (NACE 32) and Other transport equipment (NACE 35) are excluded due to too few 
observations for reliable estimates.   
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productivity ratio. We expect this ratio to be higher in sectors characterized by higher 
union bargaining power. The correlation between the two is indeed positive and equal 
to 0.35.  
Comparing Figures 4 and 5, we observe that sectors with higher mark-ups are 
often sectors with stronger union bargaining power. For instance, the sector of 
Electrical Machinery has the highest bargaining power, which coincides with high 
mark-ups. At the other end of the range, for example the Furniture sector is 
characterized by both a low bargaining power and mark-up. This positive correlation 
is clearly shown in Figure 6 where we plot the union bargaining power against the 
mark-up for each sector. The statistically significant Pearson correlation coefficient 
between the two parameters equals 0.56.14 Those results suggest that unions are able 
to negotiate successful deals in sectors with substantial economic rents but find 
limited room for wage gains in competitive sectors where the average mark-up is low. 
The Marshall rules of derived demand may provide some insights for the 
interpretation of the observed patterns. The second law states that the demand for 
labor will be more elastic, the greater the own-price elasticity of demand for the 
output it produces. It is clear that the Lerner index equals the inverse of the own-price 
elasticity, i.e. a lower Lerner index coincides with a more elastic demand. In view of 
this fact, it is not surprising that unions tend to organize themselves in sectors with 
higher price-cost margins since labor demand is less elastic in these sectors. As a 
result, higher wage claims will not lead to large employment cutbacks.  
 
4.3. The impact of globalization 
 
In Table 4 we turn to the impact of globalization on mark-ups and union 
bargaining power. The first three columns report OLS estimates, while the last three 
report the same specifications but with the Olley-Pakes correction. We start by 
augmenting equation (11) with import penetration15 and interactions of import 
penetration with the right hand side variables in (11), to test whether higher import 
                                                 
14 The same exercise was done using different depreciation levels to compute investment to correct for 
the unobservable productivity growth using Olley-Pakes. We also experimented with a system GMM 
estimator as in Blundell and Bond (1998), using lagged employment and output as instruments. The 
results did not change.  
15 Import penetration in sector j is defined as: 
jtjt
jt
productionimports
imports
+
. 
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penetration is associated with lower mark-ups and lower bargaining power16. As 
discussed in section II, we expect that import competition lowers mark-ups as more 
import competition disciplines firm price setting behaviour. We expect the union 
bargaining power to be lower in sectors with high import penetration rates. Binmore 
et al. (1986) show how bargaining power can be determined by the perceived risk of 
both parties that bargaining will break down. So, if unions think globalization 
increases the risk of firms leaving the bargaining table, their bargaining power will 
drop. In the same line of reasoning, Dumont et al. (2006) claim that bargaining power 
can be considered as a measure of the credibility of the respective outside options. As 
globalization increases the credibility of the firm leaving the bargaining round, sectors 
with higher import penetration should be associated with lower bargaining power. 
From columns (2) and (5) we note that import penetration has indeed a negative and 
significant effect on the mark-up and on the bargaining power of unions17. In 
particular, from column (6) it can be noted that a hypothetical autarkic sector would 
have a Lerner index of 0.259. A sector evaluated at the average import penetration 
rate (50%) has only a Lerner index of 0.234 This means that a sector facing the 
average amount of foreign competition has a 10% lower price-cost margin than a 
sector facing no import competition. Similar, unions are able to capture 13% of the 
rents in sectors with no import competition while they only capture 11% in sectors 
with average import competition, which means a difference of 15%.18 As a robustness 
check, column (2) is also estimated using a model with firm fixed effects. The results, 
reported in column (7), show no quantitative nor qualitative differences with the 
pooled OLS or Olley-Pakes estimates.  
In columns (3) and (6) we add a dummy LARGE which equals one if the firm 
has more than 50 employees. This dummy interacted with bargaining captures an 
essential aspect of firm level bargaining in the Belgian economy. Large firms have 
                                                 
16 Whenever the interaction between a variable and the Lerner index term or bargaining term is 
included, the variable itself also enters the equation, but results are omitted here. 
17 As noted above, import penetration itself is included in the regression. The coefficient is positive and 
highly significant. Under the classical interpretation of the left hand side variable in equation (11) as 
the Solow residual, this implies that sectors with higher import competition are more productive than 
less open sectors. 
18 The inclusion of import penetration on itself interacted with the Lerner and bargaining term, implies 
that a difference in import penetration between 0 and 10% has the same impact as a difference between 
80% and 90%. To control for this, we also included import penetration squared next to import 
penetration and interacted it with the right hand side variables. As expected, the coefficient for the 
interaction between import penetration and the right hand side variables was negative and the 
coefficient at the interaction with import penetration was positive. This points towards smaller 
marginal effects of import penetration on mark-ups and bargaining for higher import penetration rates.  
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different legal obligations for union representation than small firms. In large firms it is 
moreover easier to organize a strike which can put pressure on the negotiations. 
Hence we expect the LARGE dummy to be positive. However, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant from zero. 
In this same specification we also check whether the share of employment in 
foreign firms19 in total sectoral employment matters for the bargaining power. One 
would expect this interaction to be negative since multinationals may be more 
footloose than domestic firms and as a result unions fear multinationals will reallocate 
their production. The OLS results find this to be the case, but this effect becomes 
insignificant when applying the Olley-Pakes correction. 
Finally, the Lerner index and bargaining term were interacted with a foreign 
owner dummy19. The interactions show up to be insignificant except for the impact of 
foreign ownership on the Lerner index when applying the Olley-Pakes correction. The 
results show that foreign firms have a higher mark-up than domestic firms. Most 
theoretical and empirical literature shows that foreign firms are more efficient than 
domestic firms and should therefore, all other things equal, be able to charge a higher 
mark-up.  
 
The above results show that sectors with high import penetration rates tend to 
have lower mark-ups and union bargaining power. Now, we distinguish between the 
different source countries of imports. In our dataset we observe for each 4 digit 
NACE sector the amount of imports coming from each country. We classify all 
countries in four groups, namely imports from other EU 15 countries, imports from 
the 10 new EU members, imports from OECD countries other than EU 25 and 
countries other than EU 25 and OECD. The last category can be seen as a low wage 
countries group. Import penetration from country group k  in sector j  is now defined 
as20 
jj
jk
jk productionimportstotal
imports
IP += _  such that ∑==
4
1k
jkj IPIP . 
Figure 7 shows the import penetration evolution for all four groups of 
countries. Especially imports from low wage countries and the new EU accession 
countries have increased the past 10 years. However, it should be noted that the bulk 
of imports still come from other EU 15 countries. In 2004, almost 75% of Belgian 
                                                 
19 A foreign firm is a firm which has any foreign owner in 2004. 
20 For expositional reasons, time subscripts are omitted. 
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imports came from other EU 15 countries, while the new accession countries and low 
wage countries accounted for 2.4% and 12.1% respectively. The share of imports 
from OECD countries other than EU 25 was 13.4%. In Figure 8 import penetration is 
shown per NACE 2 digit sector21. It is clear that sectors with relatively high import 
rates from low wage countries are Wearing Apparel, Leather, Furniture and other 
Manufacturing, Textiles and Wood Products. Sectors with almost no imports from 
low wage countries include Chemicals, Motor Vehicles and Publishing and Printing.  
We use these figures to estimate whether mark-ups are correlated differently 
with import penetration from different countries. Results are shown in Table 5. The 
only interaction that is strongly significant in all specifications is the one with imports 
from low wage countries22. The results show that sectors with high competition from 
low wage countries have a significantly lower mark-up and union bargaining power, 
and this for both the pooled OLS results as for the equation with the Olley-Pakes 
correction. The results imply that a sector facing high import competition from low 
wage countries (25%) has an average price-cost margin of 0.197 while a sector 
characterized by no import competition from low wage countries shows on average a 
Lerner index of 0.250. Union bargaining power equals 0.13 and 0.10 in sectors with 
autarky and high import competition respectively. This is consistent with Bernard et 
al. (2006) who show that plant survival and growth are negatively associated with 
imports from low-wage countries. Because of the fear of firms exiting the market, 
unions will be more reluctant to press for higher wages. Again as a robustness check, 
we ran the same regression as in column (2) but now with firm fixed effects. Results 
are reported in column (5) and show that the main conclusions hold also for this 
specification.  
 
 
                                                 
21 Imports from new accession countries are included in EU 25 figures, since the share of imports for 
this countrygroup was too small to show in the graph. 
22 Also the interaction between import penetration from new EU countries is significant. Since both 
imports from low wage countries and EU accession countries show a clear upward trend, we ran the 
regressions with year dummies interacted with the Lerner index and bargaining power next to 
interactions with the import penetration variables. As a result interactions with import penetration from 
new EU countries became insignificant. The results for import penetration from low wage countries did 
not change.  
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4.4. Outsourcing 
 
In recent years, outsourcing of intermediate inputs has developed at a fast 
pace. In this section we attempt to measure the impact of outsourcing on mark-ups 
and union bargaining power. We expect intermediate imports to have a positive 
influence on a firm’s mark-up because imported intermediates lower total costs and 
thus increase the mark-up, all else equal (e.g. Amiti and Konings 2005). The impact 
of outsourcing on union bargaining power is less clear. On the one hand, a high 
outsourcing degree of a sector can lower the union bargaining power of a firm. This 
will be true when unions fear that firms will outsource more of their production to 
low-wage countries if wages are set too high. On the other hand, Kramarz (2003) 
suggests that bargained wages will increase in the intermediate imports since firms 
which buy their intermediates abroad have to specify the amount of intermediates, 
their attributes,… well in advance to the foreign producer. When the bargaining 
between union and firm takes place, the intermediates are already ordered. This 
provides the unions with hold-up opportunities. 
Following Feenstra ad Hanson (1996) we measure outsourcing as the share of 
imported intermediate inputs in total intermediate inputs23. We observe both variables 
directly from the Belgian input-output tables for the years 1995 and 200024. For the 
whole manufacturing sector (NACE 15 to 36) in the year 2000, 69% of all 
intermediates was imported. In 1995, this percentage was 64%. Figure 9 shows the 
outsourcing measure for each 2 digit NACE sector (except for the Tobacco industry). 
Sectors with the most imported intermediates are the Pulp and Paper Products, 
Transport Equipment, Office Machinery, and Radio, TV and Communication sectors. 
Among sectors with the lowest level of outsourcing are Food and Beverages as well 
as Publishing and Printing, Fabricated Metals and Mineral Products. Most sectors 
have witnessed an increase in there imported intermediates between 1995 and 2000. 
To measure the impact of outsourcing on bargaining, we interact the Lerner 
and bargaining term with the outsourcing measure. To prevent that outsourcing also 
captures import penetration, this we decided to additionally interact the Lerner index 
and bargaining term with import penetration. We do not only include the level of 
                                                 
23 Intermediate inputs are defined as inputs coming from industrial sectors (NACE 15 to 36) 
24 These tables are made every five years, the most recent was from 2005 and used data from 2000. 
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outsourcing in the equations but also the growth in outsourcing25. The results are 
reported in Table 5. The first three columns represent simple OLS estimations, the last 
three columns show the same equations but with Olley-Pakes correction. The results 
show clearly that the growth in outsourcing is positively correlated with both mark-
ups and union bargaining power while the level of outsourcing has no significant 
effect. Increased outsourcing is likely to have a positive impact on efficiency and 
productivity as suggested by a number of recent papers that have studied the impact of 
outsourcing on total factor productivity (f.e. Girma and Görg 2004) . The results in 
Table 5 confirm this hypothesis. While these results indicate that outsourcing is 
associated with efficiency gains, this process could still coincide with job destruction 
as firms are contracting out tasks which could be performed abroad more efficiently. 
We can also note that bargaining power increases with increased outsourcing, which 
is consistent with the lock-in story suggested by Kramarz.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
During the last decade, Europe has witnessed an accelerated process of 
economic integration. Within the EU, trade barriers were removed and the euro was 
introduced. The EU has been enlarged with ten new member states and imports from 
low wage countries have risen dramatically. Economic integration is likely to have an 
impact on labor and product markets which are both characterized by structural 
rigidities. Most papers study the impact of economic integration on product and labor 
markets separately although they are clearly interlinked. Our paper bridges this gap by 
looking at the link between globalization and product and labor market imperfections 
simultaneously. To do this, we rely on a rich panel of Belgian manufacturing firms. 
We use a model that allows us to estimate product market power and union bargaining 
power simultaneously.  
Several results emerge from our estimations. We show that union bargaining 
power and product market power are positively correlated. Unions are able to 
negotiate successful deals in sectors with high mark-ups, while they are more 
reluctant to press for high wage claims in more competitive sectors.  
                                                 
25 Growth = (outsourcing2000-outsourcing1995)/outsourcing2000 
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Concerning the impact of globalization, we find sectors with high import 
penetration rates to have significantly lower mark-ups and union bargaining power. 
This result is consistent with the imports as market disciplining device and several 
papers that look at the impact of globalization on union bargaining power. 
Furthermore, we split up import penetration rates with respect to the country where 
the imports come from. Especially imports from low wage countries are shown to be 
concentrated in sectors characterized by low mark-ups and bargaining power. Finally 
we show that sectors that have been rationalizing their production process by 
outsourcing part of their production, tend to have higher mark-ups and union 
bargaining power. 
 18
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Table 1 Openness 1992-2004 (ratio of imports and exports to GDP in  
current prices) 
 
 1992 1997 2004 
Openness EU 15 0.51 0.61 0.68 
Openness EU 25 NA 0.62 0.70 
Openness EU 15 (extra EU trade 
only) 
0.14 0.20 0.21* 
Fraction imports from US in total 
Extra EU 15 imports 
0.19 0.20 0.15* 
Fraction imports from China in 
total Extra EU 15 imports 
0.04 0.06 0.10* 
Fraction imports from CEEC in 
total Extra EU 15 imports 
NA 0.10 0.16* 
Fraction exports to US in total 
Extra EU 15 exports 
0.19 0.19 0.22* 
Fraction exports to China in total 
Extra EU 15 exports 
0.02 0.02 0.04* 
Fraction exports to CEEC in total 
Extra EU 15 exports 
NA 0.14 0.18* 
Share of imports of services in 
total (EU 15) 
0.20 0.20 0.21* 
Share of imports of services in 
total (EU 25) 
NA 0.20 0.21* 
Share of exports of services in 
total (EU 15) 
0.21 0.20 0.22* 
Share of exports of services in 
total (EU 25) 
NA 0.20 0.22* 
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations 
*refers to the year 2003 rather than 2004 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics of the Sample of Belgian Firms 
 
Variable Mean Median S.D. 
Turnover (X 1000 Euro) 24495 3048 156195 
Employment  78 17 305 
Material costs (X 1000 Euro) 18578 1917 131661 
Tangible Fixed Assets 4062 472 25819 
Labor cost per worker (X 1000 Euro) 35.6 34.1 17.7 
Labor cost share in turnover 0.22 0.20 0.13 
Material costs share in turnover 0.66 0.67 0.16 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Mark-up and Bargaining for Manufacturing as a Whole 
 
 OLS1 OLS2 OP 
Lerner index 0.222 0.259 0.250 
 (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.008)** 
Δk 0.103 0.065  
 (0.005)** (0.006)**  
Bargaining term  0.132 0.137 
  (0.005)** (0.007)** 
Mark-up 1.29 1.35 1.33 
Returns to scale 1.13 1.06  
Bargaining power  0.117 0.120 
Observations 30398 30398 16985 
R-squared 0.31 0.39 0.36 
Nr. Firms 6125 6125 4704 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 4 Determinants bargaining power and mark-up 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OP1 OP2 OP3 FE 
Lerner Index 0.265 0.28 0.279 0.259 0.263 0.259 0.285 
 [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.004]** 
Δk 0.044 0.045 0.044    0.046 
 [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]**    [0.003]** 
bargaining 0.131 0.154 0.161 0.136 0.148 0.145 0.156 
 [0.004]** [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.005]** [0.009]** [0.011]** [0.004]** 
Importpenetration X Lerner -0.021 -0.058 -0.060 -0.030 -0.043 -0.046 -0.055 
 [0.008]** [0.013]** [0.014]** [0.024] [0.026]+ [0.025]+ [0.008]** 
Importpenetration X Bargaining  -0.058 -0.058  -0.032 -0.034 -0.056 
  [0.014]** [0.014]**  [0.020] [0.020]+ [0.008]** 
LARGE X Bargaining   0.008   0.011  
   [0.007]   [0.013]  
FOREIGN X Lerner   0.016   0.037  
   [0.014]   [0.020]+  
FOREIGN X Bargaining   0.002   0.016  
   [0.017]   [0.017]  
Foremploymentshare X Bargaining   -0.027   -0.001  
   [0.012]*   [0.022]  
Observations 27337 27337 27337 15336 15336 15336 27337 
R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.39 
Nr. Firms 5491 5491 5491 4246 4246 4246 5491 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Table 5 Source of imports and Lerner/bargaining power 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) (3) 
 OLS1 OLS2 OP1 OP2 FE 
Lerner 0.260 0.272 0.251 0.254 0.277 
 [0.006]** [0.008]** [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.004]** 
Δk 0.045 0.046   0.047 
 [0.005]** [0.005]**   [0.003]** 
Bargaining 0.132 0.148 0.136 0.144 0.150 
 [0.004]** [0.007]** [0.005]** [0.009]** [0.004]** 
Imp.Pen.intraEU15 X Lerner 0.031 0.007 0.015 0.011 0.009 
 [0.014]* [0.021] [0.037] [0.039] [0.013] 
Imp.Pen.OECD X Lerner 0.02 0.016 0.027 0.012 0.009 
 [0.035] [0.058] [0.097] [0.102] [0.036] 
Imp.Pen.Other X Lerner -0.143 -0.249 -0.195 -0.228 -0.237 
 [0.024]** [0.036]** [0.056]** [0.062]** [0.021]** 
Imp.Pen.NewEU X Lerner -0.442 -0.154 0.007 0.187 -0.13 
 [0.122]** [0.226] [0.388] [0.427] [0.136] 
Imp.Pen.IntraEU15 X Bargaining  -0.033  -0.021 -0.03 
  [0.022]  [0.029] [0.014]* 
Imp.Pen.OECD X Bargaining  -0.011  -0.030 -0.027 
  [0.068]  [0.103] [0.041] 
Imp.Pen.Other X Bargaining  -0.184  -0.116 -0.170 
  [0.040]**  [0.059]* [0.023]** 
Imp.Pen.NewEU X Bargaining  0.509  0.764 0.493 
  [0.290]+  [0.372]* [0.160]** 
Observations 27337 27337 15336 15336 27337 
R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.36 0.39 
Nr. Firms 5491 5491 4246 4246 5491 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 26
 
Table 6 Impact outsourcing on mark-up and bargaining power. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OP1 OP2 OP3 
Lerner 0.284 0.247 0.224 0.257 0.196 0.165 
 (0.023)** (0.025)** (0.026)** (0.041)** (0.044)** (0.046)** 
Δk 0.044 0.045 0.045    
 (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.005)**    
bargaining 0.150 0.124 0.121 0.138 0.111 0.103 
 (0.025)** (0.027)** (0.027)** (0.038)** (0.041)** (0.043)* 
Outsourcing*Lerner -0.040 0.001 0.074 -0.011 0.055 0.126 
 (0.038) (0.04) (0.045)+ (0.068) (0.07) (0.078) 
Outsourcing*bargaining -0.031 -0.001 0.043 -0.002 0.028 0.062 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.047) (0.065) (0.068) (0.074) 
(ΔOutsourcing)*Lerner  0.049 0.041  0.098 0.091 
  (0.011)** (0.012)**  (0.021)** (0.023)** 
(ΔOutsourcing)*bargaining  0.038 0.026  0.041 0.034 
  (0.012)** (0.013)*  (0.016)* (0.018)+ 
Import penetration*Lerner   -0.054   -0.038 
   (0.015)**   (0.029) 
Imp. Pen.*bargaining   -0.056   -0.03 
   (0.016)**   (0.022) 
Observations 30398 30398 27337 16985 16985 15336 
R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.35 0.36 0.36 
Nr. Firms 6125 6125 5491 4704 4704 4246 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 27
Figure 1 Belgian trade and production 
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Figure 2 Import penetration per sector 
 
Import Penetration Rate per Sector
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Of
fic
e m
ac
hin
ery
, c
om
p
Le
ath
er
Me
dic
al 
eq
., o
pti
ca
l in
str
.
Ra
dio
, te
lev
isi
on
, c
om
m.
We
ari
ng
 ap
pa
rel
Mo
tor
 ve
hic
les
Fu
rni
tur
e, 
ma
nu
. n
.e.
c
Ot
he
r tr
an
sp
ort
Ma
ch
ine
ry
Pu
lp 
an
d p
ap
er 
pro
du
cts
Wo
od
 pr
od
uc
ts
Ru
bb
er 
an
d p
las
tic
Ch
em
ica
ls
Ele
ctr
ica
l m
ac
hin
ery
Te
xti
les
Ba
sic
 m
eta
ls
Fa
bri
ca
ted
 m
eta
ls
Fo
od
 an
d b
ev
era
ge
s
Mi
ne
ral
 pr
od
uc
ts
Pu
bli
sh
ing
 an
d p
rin
tin
g
Im
po
rt
 P
en
et
ra
tio
n
1997 2004
 
 
 28
 
Figure 3 Interaction between labor market and product market 
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Figure 4 Mark-up per NACE 2 digit Sector 
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Figure 5 Bargaining power per NACE 2 digit sector 
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Figure 6 Link between mark-ups and bargaining power 
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Figure 7 Trend import penetration different country groups 
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Figure 8 Import penetration per sector and country group 
Import Penetration by Country of Origin
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Figure 9 Outsourcing measure per sector 
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Appendix:  Controlling for the unobserved productivity shock 
 
We start from an adjusted version of equation (4):, 
 
itititKititMititLit akmlq Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ ,,, εεε     (A1) 
This expression can be rewritten in the following way: 
))(1( ,,, itititKitititMititLit akqmlq Δ+Δ−+Δ=Δ−Δ−Δ εββαα  (A2) 
 
Where ita  can be decomposed in itω  and itη . itω represents firm specific 
productivity, observed by the firm when making its variable inputs decisions in period 
t , but not by the econometrician. itη  is an i.i.d. error term, either measurement error 
or a productivity shock not anticipated by the firm when making its input decisions. 
The accumulation equation for capital is given by ttt ikk +−=+ )1(1 δ , where ti  
represents investment and δ  the depreciation rate of capital. A firm makes the 
investment decision in period t , which enters the capital stock in period 1+t . Olley 
and Pakes (1996) show that in equilibrium, investment at period t  is a function of 
capital and productivity in period t .  
 
),( ititit kii ω=         (A3) 
 
Provided 0>iti , this function is increasing in ita  and thus invertible: 
 
),( ititit kih=ω         (A4) 
 
It follows then that: 
 
),,,()(),( 1111 −−−− =−−=Δ ititititititititit kkiigkihkihω    (A5) 
 
This expression states the unobservable change productivity shock as a function of 
observables. Proxying for this function by a polynomial in capital and investment, 
both in present and lagged values, allows us to control for the unobserved productivity 
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shock in equation (11). As a result reliable estimates for the Lerner index and union 
bargaining power are obtained; Because of the construction of a polynomial in 
investment and capital to proxy for the unobserved productivity shock, it is not 
possible to separately identify an estimate for the returns to scale. 
 
Rewriting equation (A2) , the equations, under the assumption of perfect competition 
on the labour markets and an efficient bargaining framework respectively26 are the 
following:  
 
ititititititititMititLit kkiigqmlq ηβαα +′+Δ=Δ+Δ−Δ −− ),,,()( 111,,    (A6) 
itititititititLitititMititLit kkiiglqmlq ηαββαα +′+Δ−+Δ=Δ+Δ−Δ −− ),,,()1()( 11,21,,  (A7) 
 
                                                 
26 Note that the efficient bargaining framework seems to be inconsistent with the Olley-Pakes 
methodology at first sight. Olley and Pakes (1996) assume perfect competition in the labour market, so 
firms can freely adjust their labor stock at a given wage rate. However, Belgian firms can react to 
productivity shocks by making use of temporarily labor contracts and interim labor. All this at a given 
wage rate, since this is negotiated every two years in the joint commission the firm belongs to. 
